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Abstract In this paper, we present the results of a Learning-to-Forecast Ex-
periment (LtFE) eliciting short- as well as long-run expectations about the
future price dynamics in markets with positive and negative expectations feed-
back. Comparing our results on short-run expectations to the LtFE literature,
we prove that eliciting long-run expectations neither has an impact on the price
dynamics nor on short-run expectations formation. In particular, we confirm
that the Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE) is a good benchmark only
for the markets with negative feedback. Interestingly, our data show that the
term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations is convex in pos-
itive feedback markets and concave in negative feedback markets. Differences
in the slope of the term structure stem from diverse degrees of uncertainty on
the evolution of prices in the two feedback systems: (i) in the negative feed-
back system, the convergence of the price to the REE mirrors into a tendency
for coordination of long-run expectations around the fundamental value; (ii)
conversely, the instability of the REE in the positive feedback system and the
resulting oscillatory price dynamics are responsible for the diverging pattern
of long-run expectations. Finally, we propose a new measure of heterogeneity
of expectations based on the scaling of the dispersion of expectations over the
forecasting horizon.
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1 Introduction
The expectations of an economic agent on the future state of the economy
affects her individual choices. When aggregating all individual choices, their
expectations influence the realizations of the macroeconomic quantities. At
the same time, the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates impact how agents
revise their expectations. The Economy can be, then, model as an expectations
feedback system. How agents form their expectations at the individual level,
therefore, plays an important role in understanding the dynamics of aggregate
outcome in Economics. The rational expectation framework gives a normative
indication on how expectations should be consistently formed within a given
model, typically ignoring the presence of heterogeneity among agents’ expec-
tations. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that individuals possess heteroge-
neous expectations about the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates. Put it
differently, “not everyone has the same expectations”, Mankiw et al. (2004).
The origin of the heterogeneity across individual expectations and the role that
it plays in shaping aggregate outcomes is an important topic in theoretical as
well a empirical investigation in Macroeconomics. The fact that expectations
are not directly observable, like prices or volumes, constitutes a relevant lim-
itation for fully understand their precise role in driving the macroeconomic
aggregates.
Conducting forecasting surveys is one of the methods traditionally used
to elicit individual expectations (see Manski (2004)). This methodology has
been extensively used in Macroeconomics, for instance, in testing for forecast-
ers accuracy and rationality. Only recently, disagreement about expectations,
measured as the cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts, and its evolution over
time have become in itself a variable of interest. It seems to carry information
on the uncertainty about, for instance, future development of business cycles
or inflation rate (see Mankiw et al. (2004)). In order to disentangle whether
the origin of the observed forecasts dispersion is a measure of intrinsic uncer-
tainty of macroeconomic variables or it reflects heterogeneous priors of fore-
casters, Patton and Timmermann (2010) focus on how expectations dispersion
evolves over different time horizons. They study the term structure of cross-
sectional dispersion of forecasts, observing that it typically increases with the
forecasting horizon. Their analysis reveals that such persistent heterogeneity
of expectations among forecasters in the short-run stems from different private
information, whereas in the long-run is due to the forecasters heterogeneity
regarding their priors and/or prediction models.
Laboratory experiments, like surveys, give us the possibility to directly
elicit individual expectations, with the additional advantages of monitoring
the information available to the subjects and using performance-based in-
centives. Within the experimental literature, LtFEs, introduced by Marimon
et al. (1993), allow to study the formation of individual expectations within
different expectations feedback systems, where the price depends on subjects’
predictions. By using this experimental framework, many experiments investi-
gate agents’ expectations in financial markets (Hommes et al. (2005),Bao and
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Ding (2016)), commodity markets (Bao et al. (2013)) and in a macroeconomic
framework (Assenza et al. (2011); Cornand and M’baye (2016)), just to cite
a few contributions. In those articles, subjects have to predict prices within
an horizon of one or two steps-ahead. One of the most pervasive empirical
findings is that often rational expectations do not constitute a good predictor
for subjects’ expectations. Subjects, instead, show a certain degree of hetero-
geneity in their predictions. However, the reported level of heterogeneity is
based on subjects’ short-run predictions, which might distort the evaluation
of their level of disagreement. What would happen if we evaluate subjects’
heterogeneity eliciting long-run expectations?
In order to answer to this question, we conduct a LtFE in which, unlike
the standard settings1, subjects submit predictions at time horizons ranging
from one- to more than ten-steps ahead. We elicit subjects’ long-run expec-
tations at the beginning of every period, giving the possibility to revise their
expectations as new information becomes available. We extend the novel set-
ting introduced by Colasante et al. (2018), comparing two different expecta-
tions feedback systems, following the original contribution of Heemeijer et al.
(2009), that considers short-run predictions only. As in Heemeijer et al. (2009),
we run two treatments: one with positive and one with negative feedback sys-
tem. The positive feedback system mimics the behavior of financial markets
where prices typically raise if investors expect positive changes. Conversely,
the negative feedback system describes commodities markets where, due to
the delay in the production adjustment, market prices move in the opposite
direction with respect to expectations. The aim of our experiment is to in-
vestigate the impact of the expectation feedback system in the formation of
long-run expectations.
Our results on coordination and convergence of short-run expectations,
as well as on the evolution of prices, are in line with those reported in the
LtFEs literature (see Hommes (2015)). Moreover, following the literature on
macroeconomic forecasts based on surveys, we investigate the degree of dis-
agreement of subjects’ expectations at different time horizons, measuring the
term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations. We propose
a one-parameter term structure model to characterize the degree of disagree-
ment of expectations in the two treatments. Such characterization provides
us with relevant information on how subjects form their long-run expecta-
tions. Enlarging the forecasting horizon reveals that subjects learn the REE
in markets with negative feedback. We observe that the dispersion of long-run
expectations around the fundamental price reduces over time to reach almost
fully convergence and coordination on REE. By estimating the term struc-
ture of expectations, we demonstrate that mutual coordination of expecta-
tions and their convergence to the fundamental price follow the same pattern.
Conversely, in the market with positive feedback, we find a persistently high
level of disagreement among forecasters, measured as a convex shape of the
1 For a comprehensive survey on macroeconomic experiments on expectations see Assenza
et al. (2014)
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term structure, which is compatible with a heterogeneous extrapolative rules
employed by subjects when forming their expectations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we describe the
experimental setting; in section 3, we introduce the theoretical framework and
the working hypotheses; section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis;
section 5 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2 Experimental Design
We conduct a LtFE similar to Colasante et al. (2018) where the task of sub-
jects is to forecast the evolution of prices at different time horizons. In order
to test the effect of the feedback system on expectations formation, we im-
plement two treatments: in the first treatment, we consider a market with a
positive feedback, whereas in the second treatment we consider a market with
a negative feedback between subjects’ expectations and market price.
Each market consists of 6 subjects playing the role of professional forecast-
ers for 20 periods (see the translated instructions in Appendix B.1). Subjects
are asked to submit their short- and long-run price predictions. This means
that, at the beginning of period t, subject i submits her short-run prediction
for the market price at the end of period t, denoted as ip
e
t,t, as well as her set of
long-run predictions for the price at the end of each one of the 20−t remaining
periods. Long-run predictions are denoted as ip
e
t,t+kwith 1 ≤ k ≤ 20− t.2
We implement the adjustment mechanism of prices proposed by Heemeijer
et al. (2009) and employed by Colasante et al. (2018) in a LtFE eliciting long-
run expectations. In the positive feedback treatment the realized price depends
positively on the average short-run price forecasts. The adjustment mechanism
is:
pt = pf +
1
1 + r
(p¯et,t − pf ) + t . (1)
In the negative feedback treatment the realized price each period depends
negatively on the average subejects’ short-run forecasts and it is computed as
follows:
pt = pf − 1
1 + r
(p¯et,t − pf ) + t , (2)
where r= 0.05 in all sessions and d is equal to 3.5 or 3.25 depending on the
session.3 The constant fundamental price is computed as pf =
d
r . The term
p¯et,t in the pricing equation is the average of the six one-step-ahead predictions
submitted at the beginning of period t, p¯et,t =
1
6
∑6
i=1 ip
e
t,t. Finally, the term
t ∼ N(0, 0.25) is an iid Normal shock. The main difference between eq. (1)
2 Although we collect from each subject 20 one-step-ahead predictions instead of 50 as in
most LtFEs, within our experimental setting, we can monitor the entire time-spectrum of
expectations and its evolution over time.
3 The values of the interest rate and average dividend are constant through a given session.
To avoid the effects of communication among subjects between sessions, we set two different
values of the dividend, so that we have some markets with a fundamental price of 65 and
others with 70.
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and eq. (2) is how expectations affect the price: eq.(1) describes a positive
feedback system where subjects predictions are self-fulfilling, i.e. the higher is
the average forecast, the higher will be the price; eq. (2) describes, instead, a
system in which there is a negative feedback between expectations and price.
Individual earnings each period are computed as ipit = ipi
s
t +ipi
l
t and depend
on the accuracy of the subject’s short- and long-run forecasts. We denote as
ipi
s
t and ipi
l
t the profit depending on the accuracy of short and long-run expec-
tations, respectively. Subjects’ gains from their short-run predictions depend
on a hyperbolic function depending on the quadratic forecasting errors:
ipi
s
t =
250
1 + ζi,t
with ζi,t =
(
ip
e
t,t − pt
2
)2
. (3)
We define ipi
l
t =
∑t−1
j=1 ipi
l
t−j,t, where ipi
l
t−j,t represents the individual profit
associated with the accuracy of the prediction submitted by subject i at the
beginning of period t−j about the asset price in period t, where 1 ≤ j ≤ t−1.
It is computed according to the following payment schedule:4
ipi
l
t−j,t =

25 if 0 ≤ iδt−j,t ≤ 5
12 if 5 < iδt−j,t ≤ 10
5 if 10 < iδt−j,t ≤ 15
0 otherwise
where iδt−j,t = |ipet−j,t − pt|. The total profit of each subject is the sum of
profits across all periods.5
The information set available to the subjects when submitting their predic-
tions is: the interest rate (r), the average dividend (d), the time series of asset
prices up to period t−1 as well as all their own (short and long-run) past pre-
dictions. Profits are calculated at the end of each period and subjects receive
information about the earnings of the last period together with the cumulative
profit up to the current period. In the instructions, we also provide qualitative
information about the feedback system implemented in the market, namely if
there is a positive or negative relationship between subjects’ one step-ahead
predictions each period and the realized price (in Appendix B.2 a screen shot
of the experiment is shown).
The experimental sessions were conducted in the Laboratory of Experi-
mental Economics at University Jaume I. A total of 90 subjects6 participated
4 We used a payoff mechanism similar to Haruvy et al. (2007). Note that we implement a
step-function instead of a smooth payoff function equal to eq. (3) for long-run predictions.
We consider that a smooth payoff function for the long-run predictions could probably
discourage subjects to provide accurate forecasts, since they would perceive it as too a
difficult task to gain profits.
5 We gave the same weight to short and long-run predictions in the subjects’ final payoff by
calibrating the parameters of the pay-off functions such that approximately max
∑20
t=1 ipi
s
t =
max
∑20
t=1 ipi
l
t.
6 Each subject participated only in one session.
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and 15 markets were implemented: 7 with positive and 8 with negative feed-
back. Each session lasted approximatively 50 minutes and the average gain
was of 20 Euros.
3 Working Hypotheses
Given the price adjustment rules in eqs. (1) and (2), the REE predicts that
the realized price pt converges to the fundamental value with fairly small fluc-
tuations proportional to the idiosyncratic shock term t. If we assume that all
subjects follow rational expectations, their predictions in each period t and for
each forecasting horizon k fluctuate around the constant fundamental value
independently of the expectations feedback system, i.e. ip
e
t,t+k ≈ pf . Plugging
this condition into eqs. (1) and (2), we obtain pt = pf + t.
Hypothesis 1: Under the rational expectations hypothesis, short- and long-
run predictions as well as prices converge to the REE, independently of the
expectations feedback system.
In our experimental setting, the REE does not depend on the expecta-
tions feedback system. On the contrary, as routinely identified in the LtFE
literature, the feedback system plays a crucial role on whether and how prices
converge to the REE and, additionally, on the dynamics of the coordination of
expectations, i.e. on the disagreement among forecasters. Following the general
theoretical predictions of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989), in markets with
positive feedback, subjects’ short-run expectations can be considered as strate-
gic complements. In those markets, hence, subjects have a strong incentive to
mutually coordinate their short-run predictions although not necessarily to
the REE. The convergence to the REE is indeed difficult to achieve, since it
requires that (almost) all subjects’ expectations are coordinated around the
fundamental value. In markets with negative feedback, subjects’ expectations
can be considered as strategic substitutes, so that subjects have an incentive
to predict low (high) prices when they expect that the other subjects will
predict high (low) prices. In those markets, therefore, we expect to observe
a lower degree of coordination of subjects’ short-run expectations. Moreover,
the convergence to the REE is more likely to be observed, since it is sufficient
that the average of the expectations is close to the fundamental value, instead
of the more stringent condition of the positive feedback, where (almost) all
expectations should coordinate around pf .
Heemeijer et al. (2009) show, by means of LtFEs, that the dynamics of
individual one-step-ahead price predictions, as well as of the market realized
price largely depend on the particular nature of the expectations’ feedback,
confirming the general theoretical predictions of Haltiwanger and Waldman
(1989). In particular, they find that, in markets with positive feedback, sub-
jects coordinate their individual one-step-ahead predictions in a few periods,
while the realized price needs a much longer number of periods to achieve some
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degree of convergence to the fundamental value. On the contrary, under nega-
tive feedback, the realized price exhibits a fast convergence to the fundamental
value, whereas subjects’ predictions need a slightly higher number of periods
to coordinate. Differently from markets with positive feedback, the coordina-
tion of short-run predictions goes almost in parallel to their convergence to
the fundamental value.
Our experimental setting shares the main characteristics of the experiment
reported in Heemeijer et al. (2009) and, therefore, we expect to observe a sim-
ilar time series properties for prices and short-run expectations depending on
the feedback system.
Hypothesis 2: Markets with positive feedback are characterized by a fast
coordination of short-run expectations and a slow convergence of the realized
price to the fundamental value, whereas markets with negative expectations
feedback are characterized by a faster convergence of the realized price to the
fundamental value and a slower coordination of short-run expectations.
If Hypothesis 2 holds for our experimental data, we can argue that elicit-
ing long-run expectations has no significant effect on the subjects’ short-run
predictions as well as on the realized price dynamics in the positive as well
as in the negative feedback expectations system.7 This allows us to directly
compare the results of our experiment to the other LtFEs in the literature,
even though we also elicit long-run expectations.
Concerning the dynamics of long-run expectations, when submitting their
long-run predictions, subjects submit at the beginning of period t their price
forecast for the end of period t+k, for all k > 0. According to eqs. (1) and (2),
the price at the end of period t + k depends on the other subjects’ short-run
predictions submitted at the beginning of period t+k. Therefore each subject
should guesstimate, k-periods in advance, the short-run expectations of the
other subjects. We expect that long-run expectations exhibit a lower degree
of coordination the longer is the forecasting horizon, given the increasing un-
certainty in guesstimating the future short-run behavior of other subjects. In
other words, we should observe a higher dispersion of subjects’ long-run expec-
tations the longer is the forecasting horizon, independently of the underlying
expectations feedback system.
Hypothesis 3: The term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of expec-
tations is positively sloped, independently of the expectations feedback system.
We expect, however, that the expectations feedback system exerts an im-
pact on the subjects’ formation of their long-run expectations and, in par-
ticular, on the value of the slope of the term structure of expectations. We
can reasonably assume that subjects follow an anchor-and-adjustment rule,
7 Colasante et al. (2017) show that Hypothesis 2 holds in the positive expectations feed-
back system.
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anchoring their (short and long-run) expectations on past prices.8 We infer
therefore that the different price dynamics observed under the two feedback
systems affects differently the dynamics of long-run expectations.
In a setting with a positive expectations feedback system, Colasante et al.
(2017, 2018) show that subjects do anchor their short- and long-run expecta-
tions to the last realized price.9 Anchoring expectations to the last realized
price helps the subjects to persistently coordinate their short-run expecta-
tions. This anchor, however, turns out to be not stable over time because of
the typical oscillatory pattern of realized prices in markets characterized by
a positive feedback. In the LtFE literature it has been shown that subjects,
within the positive expectations feedback system, often tend to linearly extrap-
olate the past observed trend of prices to predict the future price dynamics
(see Hommes (2015)). The so-called extrapolative bias, indeed, is a general
phenomenon observed in various markets; often economic agents tend to ex-
trapolate or over-extrapolate the observed increasing (decreasing) trend of the
market price (see for instance Barberis et al. (1998); Hirshleifer (2001)). We
argue, therefore, that if subjects extrapolate linearly the past trend of prices to
form their long-run expectations based on different priors, the term structure
of dispersion of long-run expectations is convex, i.e. the level of disagreement
across subjects increases more than proportionally with the forecasting hori-
zon.
To illustrate more precisely our conjecture concerning the heterogeneity
of expectations, let us assume that subjects anchor their long-run expecta-
tions to the last realized price and linearly extrapolate the past price change.
We assume that each subject has an ex-ante different prior on the extrapo-
lation coefficient mi, and for simplicity we consider that all coefficients are
independent of the period and the forecasting horizon. The coefficient mi can
be interpreted as the strength of the trend extrapolation.10 The (short- and
long-run) expectations formation rule can be written as follows:
ip
e
t,t+k = pt−1 +mi (k + 1)(pt−1 − pt−2) , (4)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ K, and K is the maximum forecasting horizon.11 Note that,
according to eq. (4), the only source of heterogeneity across subjects in the
formation of expectations is directly linked to their different priors on the
strength of trend extrapolation mi. The value of the variance of subjects’
expectations for a given period and forecasting horizon is a direct measure
8 As an example Anufriev and Hommes (2012) and Hommes (2015) introduce an hetero-
geneous expectations model showing that a set of different anchor-and-adjustment rules can
successfully reproduce experimental data in a LtFE.
9 Many contributions in the LtFEs literature have repetitively shown that the last real-
ized price constitutes an anchor in the formation of expectations; however, they limit the
forecasting horizon to one or two-steps ahead predictions.
10 The Heuristic Switching Model, introduced by Anufriev and Hommes (2012), is an
example of a model with heterogeneous in the trend extrapolation strengths.
11 A cautionary note is in order here: eq. (4) does not intend to be a precise description of
the behavior of the subjects when forming their expectations; instead it should be considered
as a simple mathematical formulation helping us to better illustrate our conjecture.
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of their degree of disagreement: a low value of the variance corresponds to a
low degree of disagreement, while a high value of the variance signals a poor
coordination of subjects’ expectations. From eq. (4) it is possible to show that
(see Appendix A for the details of the calculation):
Var[ip
e
t,t+k] = Var[mi] (k + 1)
2(pt−1 − pt−2)2 = (k + 1)2 Var[ipet,t] . (5)
The variance of the coefficients mi does not vanish, since we have assumed
heterogeneous priors among subjects. Eq. (5) is the term structure of cross-
sectional dispersion of expectations given the forecasting rule of eq. (4). It
shows that the dispersion of short-run predictions reflects the subjects’ het-
erogeneity in their prior. An observed high degree of coordination of short-run
predictions (k = 0) should not be directly interpreted as imprint of homoge-
neous expectations about future price dynamics. The linear extrapolation rule
amplifies quadratically the heterogeneity of priors across subjects.
Hypothesis 4: Within a positive expectations feedback system, the term
structure of expectations exhibits a parabolic shape.
We generalize eq. (5) in order to obtain a more flexible expression for de-
scribing the term structure of expectations in our experimental data, without
necessarily assuming a linear forecasting rule:
Var[ip
e
t,t+k] = (k + 1)
α Var[ip
e
t,t] , (6)
where α is the shape parameter. The parameter α helps to characterize the het-
erogeneity of the whole spectrum of expectations. Homogeneous expectations
are characterized by α = 0, whereas α > 0 implies that dispersion increases
with the forecasting horizon. The higher is the value of α, the higher is the de-
gree of heterogeneity of subjects’ expectations. In particular, for values of the
estimated parameter in the range 0 < α < 1, the term structure of expecta-
tions is concave, signalling a moderate degree of disagreement among subjects.
For the case α = 1, the scaling is linear. For values α > 1, the term structure is
convex, which indicates a high degree of disagreement among subjects about
future price dynamics.12
In the negative feedback markets, Heemeijer et al. (2009) has shown that
prices exhibit a fast and stable convergence to the fundamental value, despite
the lower degree of coordination of short-run expectations as compared to
the positive feedback system. Under the hypothesis that subjects form their
expectations using an anchor-and-adjustment rule, we argue that a stable dy-
namics of the anchor (namely the fast convergence of the realized price to the
fundamental value) helps subjects to reduce the uncertainty about the future
short-run predictions of the others. In other words, it becomes easier for the
subjects to guesstimate in period t the other subjects’ short-run predictions
at the beginning of period t + k. Subjects, then, learn to anchor their short-
12 In Appendix A, we provide the reader with some simple illustrative examples of the
connection between the forecasting rules and the resulting term structure.
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as well as long-run predictions to the fundamental value and, therefore, we
expect the degree of heterogeneity of long-run expectations to be rather stable
for different forecasting horizons. This implies that the estimated value of the
coefficient αˆ in eq. (6) is significantly lower than 1.
Hypothesis 5: Within a negative expectations feedback system, the term
structure of expectations exhibits a concave shape.
The empirical analysis of the term structure of cross-sectional dispersion of
expectations provides us with relevant information to better characterize the
degree of disagreement among subjects on the evolution of future prices. In
fact, if we do not consider a broader spectrum of expectations, we might end
up underestimating or overestimating subjects’ disagreement. As an example,
let us consider a scenario where subjects exhibit a strong coordination of their
short-run forecasts together with an increasing dispersion of their long-run
expectations. Measuring subjects’ disagreement as the variance of their short-
run forecasts would lead us to underestimate the level of disagreement among
subjects. On the contrary, we can think about a situation where a higher
dispersion of short-run forecasts, compared to the first scenario, remains con-
stant or decreases over different forecasting horizons (constant or decreasing
term structure). In this case, we may overestimate subjects’ disagreement. We
take the position that, the term structure of expectations provides crucial in-
formation for characterizing the heterogeneity of expectations in LtFEs, and
therefore long-run expectations cannot be ignored.
4 Results
Figures (1) and (2) show the dynamics of individual short-run predictions and
realized prices for the 7 groups with positive feedback and the 8 groups with
negative feedback. Figures (3) and (4) display, as examples, the evolution over
time of the price together with individual long-run predictions in one of the
groups in the positive and negative feedback treatment, respectively. The other
groups exhibits very similar visual behavior.
Figures from 12 to 24 in Appendix A, describe individual long-
run predictions as well as the evolution of the price for the 20 periods
and for all remaining groups in the positive and negative feedback
treatments (this material is not intended to be published, we include
these figures for the convenience of the referees).
4.1 Analysis of short-run expectations
From a first inspection of Figures 1 and 2, it is evident that, when confronting
the two expectations’ feedback systems, the realized prices exhibit remarkable
different patterns. In the positive feedback treatment prices do not show a clear
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convergence to the fundamental value. In some groups prices exhibit some kind
of monotonic trend towards the fundamental value, in other groups we observe
instead a diverging trend. Concerning individual short-run expectations we
observe that, after some initial periods of volatility, individual expectations
coordinate, although not necessarily around the fundamental value. On the
contrary, in the negative feedback treatment, after few periods, realized prices
convergence to the fundamental value, although it takes longer for subjects’
short-run expectations to coordinate.
Differences in the convergence of prices to the fundamental value between
the positive and negative feedback treatments are quantified in Figure 5, which
displays the mean absolute difference between individual short-run predictions
and the fundamental value (averaged across groups):
MAD
pf
t,t =
〈∑6
i=1 |ipet,t − pf |
6
〉
g
. (7)
The notation < ... >g denotes the average across groups. Note that k = 0
refers to short-run predictions. From Figure 5, it emerges that, although the
mean difference reduces in the first 5 periods, in the markets with positive
feedback subjects’ expectations do not converge to the fundamental value. A
Wilcoxon test shows that MAD
pf
t,t is significant for all periods, excluding the
last period. Conversely, in those markets with negative feedback, subjects’ ex-
pectations converge to the fundamental value. Nevertheless, it takes some time
for the price to converge, since it is from period 8 that we find no statistically
significant difference between expectations and the fundamental value.
Given our results concerning the convergence of short-run expectations we
can reject Hypothesis 1 in the positive feedback treatment, since the REE is
not a good benchmark to describe neither the subjects expectations nor the
price dynamics. Our results in the negative feedback treatment show that the
individual expectations and prices do converge to the REE, and therefore we
cannot reject Hypothesis 1. Those results are in line with many LtFEs reported
in the pertinent literature.
Figure 6 quantifies the coordination of subjects’ individual short-run pre-
dictions measured as the mean absolute deviation between individual one-
period-ahead forecasts and the (within-group) average of one-step-ahead ex-
pectations (averaged across groups):
MADCt,t =
〈∑6
i=1 |ipet,t − p¯et,t|
6
〉
g
(8)
In the markets with positive feedback, we observe a fast coordination of
subjects’ short-run expectations. A similar dynamics is observed in the mar-
kets with negative feedback, although it takes longer for the expectations to
coordinate.
Hypothesis 2 holds, since our results on coordination and convergence of
short-run expectations are in line with the literature: fast convergence and slow
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coordination in the negative feedback treatment, whereas slow convergence and
fast coordination in the positive feedback treatment. We can conclude therefore
that eliciting long-run expectations does not affect the main properties of
short-run expectations as well as the price dynamics.
We focus now on the analysis of individual forecasting behavior to further
confirm that our results are in line with the literature. Following Heemeijer
et al. (2009), we estimate the individual prediction strategies of subjects as-
suming that they use the following linear prediction rule:13
ip
e
t,t = ic+
3∑
k=1
iαk pt−k +
3∑
k=1
iβk ip
e
t−k,t−k + iεt . (9)
We obtain that regression (9) provides a good description for the forecasts
of 78 out of 90 subjects.14 The long-run equilibrium price level is computed
as follows:
ipˆ =
icˆ
1−∑3k=1 iαˆk −∑3k=1 iβˆk (10)
where icˆ, iαˆk and iβˆk denote the individual estimates obtained from eq. (9).
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the difference between the long-run equi-
librium price pˆ and the fundamental value pf
15 reproduce the main charac-
teristics described in Heemeijer et al. (2009): (i) in markets with a negative
feedback subjects are able to learn the REE, given the distribution is highly
concentrated around zero. (ii) In markets with a positive feedback, long-run
equilibrium prices are more dispersed around the fundamental value.
Following Heemeijer et al. (2009), since the linear prediction rule is a good
descriptor of subjects’ forecast, we estimate for each subject a simpler pre-
diction rule based on the anchor-and-adjustment heuristic. We classify the
subjects as na¨ıve, adaptive, trend follower or fundamentalist depending on the
individual parameter values. Our results are also in line with those reported
by Heemeijer et al. (2009) (see the Appendix C for the details).
The empirical analysis considering the dynamics of expectations and prices
generalize the results of Colasante et al. (2017, 2018) that eliciting long-run
expectations has no significant effect on subjects’ short-run expectations in-
dependently on the expectations’ feedback systems.
13 We use the same specification of Heemeijer et al. (2009) adapting it to our mathematical
notation.
14 We apply the Breusch-Godfrey test for small sample to check for the autocorrelation of
the residuals.
15 Since we have used two different fundamental values, in order to compare the the long-
run equilibrium price convergence to the fundamental price across markets, we use the differ-
ence between the long-run equilibrium price computed using eq. (10) and the fundamental
value.
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k
Negative Feedback Positive Feedback
All periods period< 10 period≥ 10 All periods period< 10 period≥ 10
k = 2
-2.585 -2.950 -1.106 -14.835 -11.71 -8.985
(0.01) (0.003) (0.269) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
k = 4
-3.252 -5.659 2.414 -14.435 -11.984 -8.141
(0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
k = 6
-7.578 -8.421 0.237 -12.382 -10.4 -6.69
(0.000) (0.000) (0.813) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 1: Wilcoxon test on the convergence of k-steps-ahead expectations to
the fundamental value in the positive and negative feedback treatment. We
report the z-values and the p-values in brackets.
4.2 Analysis of long-run expectations
From a first inspection of Figures 3 and 4, we observe a clear difference in the
dynamics of subjects’ long-run expectations depending on the implemented
expectations feedback system. In the positive feedback treatment, subjects’
expectations, although highly coordinated in the short-run around the last
realized price, exhibit linear trend extrapolation with different slopes, forming
some sort of cone-shaped trajectory. On the contrary, in the negative feedback
treatment, the fluctuations of short- as well as long-run expectations seem to
be much more stable fluctuating around the fundamental value.
At first sight, the dynamics of long-run expectations seems to be strongly
influenced by the underlying expectations feedback mechanism. In order to
quantify this intuition, we extend to long-run expectations the analysis of
short-run expectations concerning convergence to the fundamental value and
coordination. Figure 8 reports the average convergence of long-run expecta-
tions to the fundamental value in the positive and negative feedback treat-
ments, measured as the mean absolute difference between the fundamental
value and the expectations submitted in period t for the price in period t+ k
for different forecasting horizons k (averaged across groups):
MAD
pf
t,t+k =
〈∑6
i=1 |ipet,t+k − pf |
6
〉
g
, (11)
where k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9. Figure 8a confirms the lack of convergence to the
fundamental value of long-run expectations, which we have reported also for
short-run expectations. Concerning the negative feedback treatment Figure 8b
shows that convergence significantly improves over time, reaching apparently
almost fully convergence after period 10.
Table 1 shows that, for a given forecasting horizon k, the results of a
Wilcoxon test for the convergence of the long-run expectations. Expectations
do no convergence to the fundamental value in the positive feedback treatment,
whereas, in the negative feedback treatment, long-run expectations converge
after period 10. In early periods, the distance from the fundamental value is
statistically significant. We can conclude therefore that Hypothesis 1 does not
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hold in the case of a positive feedback mechanism. Under a negative feedback
mechanism, our results show that subjects learn the REE after some time,
since they coordinate their short and long-run expectations to the fundamental
value.
Figure 9 shows the coordination of subjects predictions measured as the
mean absolute deviation between individual k-periods-ahead forecasts and
their within-group average (averaged across groups):
MADCt+k =
〈∑6
i=1 |ipet,t+k − p¯et,t+k|
6
〉
g
(12)
where k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9. Note that subjects learn to coordinate their short and
long-run expectations over time. Importantly, for a given period, the cross-
sectional dispersion of expectations systematically increases with the forecast-
ing horizon, being this effect much more pronounced in the positive feedback
treatment.
4.3 Heterogeneity of expectations
We have conjectured in Section 3 that the evolution of the dispersion of sub-
jects’ expectation over the forecasting horizon carries information on the de-
gree of heterogeneity of expectations. We have, furthermore, conjectured that
the heterogeneity of expectations depends on the feedback system. Figure 10
illustrates the evolution of the term structure of dispersion of expectations
across periods and treatments. From a first look at Figure 10 it seems that in
the positive feedback treatment the slope of the term structure is higher that
in the negative feedback treatment.
In order to quantify what is apparent from Figure 10, Table 2 displays, for
a given period, the ratio between the value of the long end and the short end
of the term structure as a proxy for the heterogeneity of expectations:16
Rt(h) =
< Var[ip
e
t,t+h] >g + < Var[ip
e
t,t+h−1] >g
< Var[ipet,t] >g + < Var[ip
e
t,t+1] >g
, (13)
where h is the difference between the longest time forecasting horizon (in
our analysis is 10-period-ahead).17 In the positive feedback treatment, the
value of Rt(h) in most of periods is well above 10, signalling a remarkable
disagreement of expectations about the future price dynamics. Conversely, in
the negative feedback treatment Rt(h) takes a value around 2, which signals a
higher degree of homogeneity of expectations. If we measure the expectations’
16 The long end of the term structure is estimated as the sum of average (across groups)
variance of expectations in the last two forecasting horizons. The short end of the term
structure is estimated as the sum of the average (across groups) variance of the expectations
in the first two forecasting horizons.
17 In periods 11, 12, and 13 the value of h is smaller, since the longest forecasting horizons
are 9, 8 and 7 periods ahead, respectively.
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heterogeneity considering the value of the variance of short-run expectations,
we might end up with the misleading idea that in positive feedback markets
subjects’ expectations are less heterogeneous compared to those in negative
feedback markets. Instead, taking into account a broader view of the evolution
of the time-spectrum of expectations, we would revise our statement. This is
an example of the importance of eliciting long-run expectations in order to
precisely measure the level of disagreement among subjects.
Period Negative feedback Positive feedback
2 1.98 3.63
3 2.69 8.02
4 2.01 12.31
5 2.76 12.59
6 2.37 17.69
7 1.24 11.42
8 1.93 16.89
9 2.34 10.48
10 1.18 5.15
11 0.62 25.82
12 1.42 17.87
13 1.34 16.98
Table 2: Rt(h) per period: Ratio between the value of the long end of the term
structure and the short end of the term structure.
Let us now analyse the empirical properties of the term structure of expec-
tations introduced in eq. (6) and the related hypotheses introduced in section
3. In order to test Hypotheses 3, 4 ad 5, we estimate the value of the shape
coefficient α from a log-linearisation of eq. (6) with “normalized” variances,
using a pooled panel regression:
log
(
< Var[ip
e
t,t+k] >g
< Var[ipet,t] >g
)
= α log(k + 1) . (14)
The normalization of the variances allows for a direct comparison of the shape
of the term structure between the two treatments. Table (3) shows the esti-
mated values of αˆ for the two treatments.
The values of αˆ are significantly different from zero in the two expecta-
tions feedback systems, confirming Hypothesis 3 which states that the term
structure exhibit a positive slope. However, in the positive feedback treatment,
the estimated value of the shape parameter αˆ is significantly higher than 1,
indicating a convex term structure. We can talk about a high level of disagree-
ment among subjects about the future dynamics of prices, despite the high
level of coordination of their short-run expectations. Hypothesis 4, namely a
parabolic shape of the term structure, does not hold, since the value of α is
significantly smaller than 2. The case αˆ > 1 mihgt indicate that subjects fol-
low extrapolative rules, but those rules are more complex than just the simple
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Negative feedback Positive feedback
log(k + 1) 0.36∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
SE (0.03) (0.03)
N 117 117
R2 0.56 0.91
∗∗∗ p-value < 0.01, ∗∗ p-value < 0.05, ∗ p-value < 0.1
Table 3: Results of the pooled panel regression from eq. (14). Dependent vari-
able: log of cross-sectional normalized variance of long-run expectation for a
given period and forecasting horizon. We consider twelve periods t = 2, ..., 13
and ten horizons k = 1, ..., 10 (when possible).
linear extrapolation assumed in Hypothesis 4. In the negative feedback treat-
ment, instead, the shape parameter turns out to be significantly smaller than
1, which indicates a concave term structure. Hypothesis 5, therefore, holds.
In section 3, we have conjectured that the concave shape of the term struc-
ture is related to the fact that subjects anchor their expectations to the past
realized price, which exhibits a fast and persistent convergence to the funda-
mental value. Such stability of the anchor helps subjects to reduce the uncer-
tainty in guestimating the future short-run predictions of the others. Subjects,
therefore, learn to coordinate their long-run expectations to the fundamental
value. In order to show that the convergence of expectations to the fundamen-
tal value smooths the heterogeneity of expectations, we introduce a similar
functional form as in eq. (6) between the mean squared deviation of long-run
expectations from the fundamental value and the forecasting horizon:
MSD
pf
t,t+k =
〈∑6
i=1(ip
e
t,t+k − pf )2
6
〉
g
, (15)
MSDpft,t+k = (k + 1)
µ MSDpft,t . (16)
We, then, estimate the corresponding parameter µ for the positive and
negative feedback treatments.18 Table 4 shows that the estimated value of
the shape parameter µˆ is not statistically different from the value of αˆ in
the negative feedback treatment. This goes into the direction of confirming
our conjecture that the convergence of expectations to the fundamental value
and their mutual coordination are closely related. Conversely, in the positive
feedback treatment, the estimated value of the shape parameter µˆ and its dif-
ference with αˆ do not give us relevant information, since long-run expectations
do not converge nor coordinate around the fundamental value.
18 We use the same pooled panel regression of the normalized variances as in eq. (14).
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Negative feedback Positive feedback
log(k + 1) 0.37∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
SE (0.03) (0.03)
N 117 117
R2 0.49 0.78
∗∗∗ p-value < 0.01, ∗∗ p-value < 0.05, ∗ p-value < 0.1
Table 4: Results of the pooled panel regression from eq. (16). Dependent vari-
able: log of average quadratic difference between individual long-run expecta-
tions pet,t+k and the fundamental value. We consider twelve periods t = 2, ..., 13
and ten forecasting horizons k = 1, ..., 10 (when possible).
5 Conclusion
We implement a LtFEs where we contemporaneously elicit short and long-run
expectations about the evolution of the price in experimental markets charac-
terized by different expectations feedback systems. In particular, we generalize
the original contribution of Heemeijer et al. (2009) eliciting long-run expec-
tations and extend the results of Colasante et al. (2017, 2018) to markets
with a negative expectations feedback system. Our results reveal that eliciting
long-run expectations does not influence subjects’ short-run expectations. We
observe, in fact, the same aggregate patterns of coordination and convergence
of short-run expectations, as well as price dynamics, reported in the LtFEs
literature. When enlarging the time spectrum of subjects’ expectations, we
observe that in the negative feedback markets, subjects learn the REE, since
they coordinate their short and long-run expectations around the fundamental
value. After a learning phase the REE turns out to be a good predictor for the
dynamics of expectations independently of the forecasting horizon. Conversely,
in the positive feedback markets, the REE does not predict the evolution of
subjects’ expectations, neither in the short- nor in the long-run. Instead, sub-
jects learn to coordinate their short-run expectations around the last realized
price, and tend to extrapolate past trend prices when forming their long-run
expectations.
Concerning the disagreement of subjects’ expectations, our empirical anal-
ysis suggests that, in order to characterize the heterogeneity of expectations it
reveals to be extremely informative to measure not only the level of dispersion
of subjects’ expectations, but also how it evolves over different forecasting hori-
zons. We propose a simple term structure model of cross-sectional dispersion
of expectations, which is defined by one parameter only, i.e the shape coeffi-
cient. The estimated values of the shape coefficient in our experimental data
turns out to provide important clues about how the feedback system affects
the mechanism of formation of (long-run) expectations. In particular, in the
markets with positive feedback the estimated value of the shape coefficient in-
dicates a convex term structure signalling a high level of disagreement among
forecasters. It is compatible with an (heterogeneous) extrapolative trend be-
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havior of subjects when forming their expectations. A concave shape char-
acterizes, instead, the term structure in the markets with negative feedback,
pointing to a smoother evolution of forecasters disagreement. We argue that
this behavior is a consequence of the stable convergence of the price to the
fundamental value, which helps the subjects to predict more accurately the
behavior of other subjects, and therefore, the dynamics of future prices.
From a more methodological perspective, we are firmly convinced that
eliciting long-run expectations in the framework of the LtFEs complements
the macroeconomic literature based on surveys on the origin of heterogeneity
of expectations. Additionally, it can be successfully employed as test-bed for
studying economic policy measures within diverse macroeconomic scenarios.
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A Term structure of cross-sectional dispersion of expectations
Let us introduce some simple examples of how a given the predictions rules for the long-run
expectations affects the term structure of cross-sectional dispersion of expectations.
Let us assume that the subjects, when forming their long run expectations, linearly
extrapolate the past price change with a coefficient mi depending on each individual subject.
Considering eq. (4), it is possible to compute the average expectation across subjects:
E[ip
e
t,t+k] = pt−1 + E[mi] (k + 1)(pt−1 − pt−2) . (17)
The variance of the expectations is therefore:
Var[ip
e
t,t+k] = Var[mi] (k + 1)
2(pt−1 − pt−2)2 . (18)
So, given that:
Var[ip
e
t,t] = Var[mi] (pt−1 − pt−2)2 , (19)
and plugging it into eq. (18), the term structure is:
Var[ip
e
t,t+h+1] = (k + 1)
2 Var[ip
e
t,t] . (20)
An alternative to the linear forecasting rule is a “random walk rule”, whose starting
value is the realized price in the previous period:
ip
e
t,t+k = pt−1 +
K∑
k=0
iηt+k , (21)
where iηt+k are iid random variables with E[iηt+k] = 0 for each k and i. Under the rule of
eq. (21), it is easy to show that the term structure of the variance is linear in the forecasting
horizon:
Var[ip
e
t,t+h+1] = (k + 1) Var[ip
e
t,t] . (22)
An additional possible forecasting rule for long-run perditions is the following:
ip
e
t,t+k = pt−1 + iξt+k , (23)
where ξt are iid random variable with E[iξt] = 0 for each t and i. The variance of the
predictions of the subjects will be independent of the forecasting horizon H:
Var[ip
e
t,t+k+1] = (k + 1)
0 Var[ip
e
t,t] = Var[ip
e
t,t] . (24)
A more general term structure for the dispersion of the predictions shows a curvature
depending on the shape parameter α.
Var[ip
e
t,t+h+1] = (k + 1)
α Var[ip
e
t,t] , (25)
which nests all the previous specific cases.
Those simple calculations show that the term structire of the variance of the subjects’
predictions can be extremely informative on possible underlying mechanism of long-run
expectations formation.
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B Instructions and Screenshot
B.1 Translated instructions
[General instructions]
Welcome to the Laboratory of Experimental Economics! You are participating in an experi-
ment in which you will take decisions in a financial market. The instructions are very simple
but, please, read them carefully.
During the whole experiment you will play with experimental money (ECU) and, at
the end of the experiment, your final profit, summed to the 3 for the show-up fee, will be
converted in Euro according to the following exchange rate: 1 Euro=500 ECU. The total
amount will be paid at the end of the experiment by cash.
[Only in the positive feedback treatment]
You are a financial advisor to a pension fund that wants to invest an amount of money to
buy an asset. The pension fund will allocate its money between a bank account which pays
fix interest rate and a risky investment. The allocation depends on your forecast accuracy.
In making your predictions remember that the market price is affected: positively by the
dividend, negatively by the interest rate and positively by the investors predictions.
[Only in the negative feedback treatment]
You are an advisor to a firm that wants to buy a certain amount of a good. In each period,
the entrepreneur decide how many units of that good he wants to buy with the aim to sell
them in the next period. To take an optimal decision, the entrepreneur requires a good pre-
diction of the market price in the next period. The price will be computed in the following
way: if the demand for the good is higher than the supply, the price will rise. Conversely,
if the supply will be higher than the demand, the price will decrease. The entrepreneur
will take his decision based on your forecasting about the market price: the higher is the
prediction, the higher will be the demand and, as a consequence, the market price will fall.
[General instructions]
Your task is to predict the price for 20 periods. In each period (t) you will predict the price
for all the remaining 20− t periods, that is, in period 1 you will make 20 predictions starting
from the prediction about the expected price for period 1, in period 2 you will make 19
predictions and so on. Your predictions must be between 0 and 100. In period 1 you will
make predictions just looking at the interest rate and at the mean dividend. From period
2 on, you will have more information: besides the interest rate and the mean dividend, you
will see a graph with the time series of your past prediction and the series of the realized
price in the market. The green dots represent the series of the predicted price for the next
period, while the blue dots represents the realized price in each period. Moreover, you will
see the values of these series and the series of all your past predictions. Remember that in
any period you will see the information about the market price of the previous period.
The interest rate will be equal to 5% and the mean dividend will be equal to 3.25 (or
3.5).
Once each player have made their prediction for the first period, the realized price will
be computed and it will be shown at the beginning of period 2. The same mechanism holds
for subsequent periods. After you insert the forecasting and the price computed, your profit
will be computed according to the forecasting accuracy. Your profit depends on your fore-
cast accuracy. The better your prediction, the higher the profit in each period. Besides the
profit for the prediction for the subsequent period, you will receive a profit for the other
predictions. This profit will be computed according to the following table:
Difference between market price of period t
and your prediction for period t
ECU
±5 25
±10 12
±15 5
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At the beginning of each period you will see the profit for all the predictions and the
cumulative gains.
B.2 Screenshot
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C Individual prediction strategies
Following Heemeijer et al. (2009), we estimate for each subject the linear forecasting rule:
ip
e
t,t = α1pt−1 + α2 ip
e
t−1,t−1 + (1− α1 − α2)pf + β(pt−1 − pt−2) + t (26)
The heuristic described in eq. (26) can be successfully estimated for 72 out of 90 subjects.
Using the estimates obtained we can classify subjects as:
(i) Fundamentalist in the negative feedback treatment: α1 + α2 ≈ 0 and β = 0
(ii) Adaptive: α1 + α2 6= 0 and β = 0
(iii) Na¨ıve: α1 ≈ 1 and α2 = β = 0;
(iv) Na¨ıve and fundamentalist: α1 < 1 and α2 = β = 0
(v) Adaptive trend follower in the positive feedback treatment: α1 6= 0, α2 6= 0 and β 6= 0
(vi) Na¨ıve trend follower in the positive feedback treatment: α1 6= 0, α2 = 0 and β 6= 0
(vii) Trend follower in the positive feedback treatment: α1 = 0, α2 = 0
Tables 5 and 6 summarize our results confronting them with those reported in Heemeijer
et al. (2009).
Prediction strategies Our results Heemeijer et al. (2009)
Na¨ıve trend follower 34% 38%
Adaptive trend follower 21% 33%
Trend follower 16% -
None 29% 29%
Observations 38 over 42 21 over 42
Table 5: Positive feedback treatment: individual prediction strategies according
to the estimated parameters in eq.(26).
Prediction strategy Our results Heemeijer et al. (2009)
Fundamentalist 36% 37%
Nave fundamentalist 15% 32%
Adaptive 13% -
Na¨ıve 8% 5%
None 28% 26%
Observations 34 over 48 19 over 36
Table 6: Negative feedback treatment: individual prediction strategies accord-
ing to the estimated parameters in eq.(26).
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Fig. 1: Realized price and individual short-run predictions of all groups in the
positive feedback treatment. The black solid line represents the realized
price, the grey lines are the individual one-step-ahead predictions and the
dashed line represents the fundamental value. In groups 1, 2 and 7 pf = 70,
while in groups 3, 4, 5 and 6 pf = 65.
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Fig. 2: Realized price and individual short-run predictions of all groups in the
negative feedback treatment. The black solid line represents the realized
price, the grey lines are the individual one-step-ahead predictions and the
dashed line represents the fundamental value. In groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 pf = 65,
while in groups 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 pf = 70.
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Fig. 3: Positive feedback:Individual long-run predictions of Group 4. The black
dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts and the
dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 4: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 7. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 5: Convergence of short-run expectations: MAD
pf
t,t in the positive and
negative feedback treatments.
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Fig. 6: Coordination of short-run expectations: MADCt,t in the positive and
negative feedback treatments.
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Fig. 7: Violin diagram of the distance between the long-run equilibrium price
computed following eq. (10) and the fundamental value in the negative and
positive feedback treatments. The white dot represents the median value equal
to 0.26 and -2.25 for the negative and positive feedback treatment, respectively.
In the two treatments a Wilcoxon test show no statistically significant differ-
ence from zero.
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Fig. 8: For each period t = 1, ..., 20, it is displayed the mean absolute deviations
between the expectations and the fundamental value for different forecasting
horizons k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9 (MAD
pf
t,t+k), averaged across groups.
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(a) Positive feedback treatment
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(b) Negative feedback treatment
Fig. 9: For each period t = 1, ..., 20 it is displayed the across groups average
MADC of the subjects’ forecasts submitted in period t for the price at the
end of period t+ k, where k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9.
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Fig. 10: Empirical term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of expec-
tations: Each histogram displays the variance of the expectations submitted
in a given period for different forecasting horizons (in the horizontal axis) in
the positive and negative feedback treatments. We consider twelve periods
t = 2, ..., 13 and ten horizons k = 1, ..., 10 (when possible).
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Fig. 11: Screen-shot of the experiment.
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A Individual long-run predictions
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Fig. 12: Positive feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 1. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 13: Positive feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 2. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 14: Positive feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 3. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 39
 
Fig. 15: Positive feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 4. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
40 Annarita Colasante et al.
 
Fig. 16: Positive feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 5. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 17: Positive feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 7. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 18: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 1. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 19: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 2. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 20: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 3. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 21: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 4. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 22: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 5. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 23: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 6. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
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Fig. 24: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 8. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
and the dashed line the fundamental value.
